ABSTRACT: This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, how earnings management and ownership retention interact, and how these two jointly affect the equilibrium market valuation of IPO firms in the presence of information asymmetry. Analytically, this paper extends the univariate signaling framework of Leland and Pyle (1977) and derives an efficient signaling equilibrium in which both reported earnings and ownership retention are endogenously chosen to convey the IPO issuer's private information. It is shown that even though either ownership retention or reported earnings communicates the issuer's type to the market unambiguously, the issuer will strategically employ both signals to achieve separation from potential lower quality imitators at minimal cost. Comparative statics analysis shows that the trade-off between the two signals depends critically on the uncertainty over future earnings. The theoretical analysis generates several empirical implications regarding market efficiency, IPO pricing, and the strategic choice of earnings management. Through systematic econometric analysis, I confirm the major predictions of the model.
I. INTRODUCTION
T his paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, how earnings management and ownership retention interact, and how these two jointly affect the equilibrium valuation of IPO firms when there is information asymmetry between the IPO issuer and perfectly rational investors. By earnings management, I refer to firms' inflating reported earnings by (1) the use of the flexibility allowed in the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to change reported earnings without changing the underlying cash flows,
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The Accounting Review, January 2007 which could be labeled as misreporting, and/or (2) constructing economic events to change the underlying cash flows itself, which could be labeled as real earnings management. 1 I first show that income-increasing earnings management can prevail as the outcome of a fully separating signaling equilibrium when an IPO issuer wants to overstate earnings to a certain level to deter a lower type from mimicking his earnings report. To the extent that earnings management is value-detrimental to the firm, the amount of earnings management necessary to achieve differentiation decreases with the level of ownership retained by the IPO issuer. I then extend Leland and Pyle's (1977) (hereafter, LP) univariate signaling model in which ownership retention is an effective signal of firm value and derive an efficient signaling equilibrium in an IPO setting in which both reported earnings and ownership retention are chosen as signaling devices. As IPO issuers can signal through both ownership retention and reported earnings, the efficient mix must minimize total signaling costs. I show that, in equilibrium, many firms both over-report earnings and deviate from the first-best level of retained ownership. Comparative statics analysis also shows that the trade-off between earnings management and ownership retention depends critically on the uncertainty over future earnings.
Prior empirical work examining earnings management behavior in the new issues market has generally focused on the notion that managers opportunistically overstate earnings to issue stocks at artificially inflated prices. As an explanation of the long-run underperformance of IPO firms, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) (hereafter, TWW) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) (hereafter, TWR) document that there is a negative correlation between issuing period abnormal accruals and post-issue abnormal stock returns of IPO firms, suggesting that investors are misled by earnings management before equity offerings and are then disappointed as expectation errors are corrected over time. In contrast to the above ''managerial opportunism'' hypothesis, I model earnings management as consequence of the actions of rational agents with asymmetric information, implying that, in equilibrium, investors rationally anticipate some amount of earnings management and should not be systematically fooled by the exaggerated earnings reports. Thus, on the empirical side, I first reexamine the robustness of the results in TWW and TWR. Using discretionary accruals estimated from cash flow statements and adjusted for a performance-matched firm's discretionary accruals as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) , I find that discretionary accruals, with or without performance matching, are the highest in the IPO year and have strong predictive power for IPO firms' subsequent decline in operating performance. However, in my sample period, there is no strong evidence that discretionary accruals estimated from cash flow statements and post-issue abnormal stock returns are negatively correlated. Performance matching further weakens the statistical and economic significance of the relationship between the two. Taken together, the results are consistent with IPO issuers advancing accruals to increase reported earnings in the issuing year, but are inconsistent with investors being systematically fooled by such window-dressing behavior. I then directly test the valuation implications of my signaling model and find that both reported earnings and ownership retention are strongly positively priced signals in valuing an IPO firm. Finally, employing a simultaneous equation framework to examine the joint determination of an IPO firm's earnings management and ownership retention decisions, I find evidence that,
The Accounting Review, January 2007 controlling for other factors, riskier IPO firms resort more to income-increasing earnings management and retain less ownership, confirming the comparative statics prediction of the model.
An initial public offering (IPO) is the first opportunity for a firm's founders and initial investors to realize the value of their ownership stake in a firm. The IPO process in the U.S. is governed by the Securities Act of 1933. A firm that decides to float a new issue hires an underwriter who performs a due-diligence investigation of the firm and then prepares an offering prospectus that presents externally audited financial statements for the most recent three years, along with information about the firm, its business, future prospects, competitors, and products. The prospectus is used as a marketing document by the underwriter in roadshows to solicit demand, in particular from institutional investors.
There is no doubt that IPOs are often associated with high information asymmetries between insiders (entrepreneurs, management, etc.) and outside investors. Inside knowledge concerning investment opportunities, managerial skills, and the ability to control future agency costs, among other things, are often the private information of management. This is a typical adverse selection problem and in the absence of a mechanism or institution that will overcome the information asymmetry, the market would fail.
LP propose a solution to this problem through a univariate signaling model with ownership retention. They argue that when making an initial public offering, the risk-averse owner of a private firm could send a signal to the market about the value of the firm by retaining part of its equity (and thus its risk). The model yields a separating equilibrium where the owners of the firms of each possible value optimally retain a specific portion of their firm's shares and investors correctly infer firm value from each firm's signal. This paper extends LP's framework to include reported earnings as a second signal of firm value for the following reasons:
• First, when valuing an IPO firm, investors would rely heavily on financial statements for valuation, relative to established firms with alternative sources of information. Underwriters often set the offer price using the price-earnings multiple of a publicly traded firm in the same industry as the prospective IPO. Thus, the IPO issuer has a strong incentive to report favorable accounting information in the prospectus to influence investors' perception of the firm's value.
• Second, IPO issuers have considerable discretion in reporting earnings. Even though the accounting reports in the offering prospectuses are required to be audited by external auditors to verify compliance with GAAP, the accrual accounting system permits considerable discretion in recognizing the timing and amounts of revenues and expenses. It is also hard for investors to judge the appropriateness of the reported accounting numbers due to the lack of other sources of corroborative information. Further, current accounting regulation (APB No. 20) allows IPO firms to change their accounting choices via retroactive restatement for all the financial statements presented in the offerings prospectus. Thus, during the IPO process, the issuer has exceptional opportunity to boost reported earnings.
• Third, and perhaps most important, income-increasing earnings management is arguably costly to the firm. Even though the manager might inflate reported earnings in a single period, over the firm's life cycle, total reported earnings must equal total cash flows. Thus, as accounting accruals eventually reverse, future earnings suffer from past manipulation, potentially triggering litigation and increases in the cost of capital. Further, some earnings management techniques have real economic costs, such as poor timing of sales and early liquidation of assets that are not ''mature''
The Accounting Review, January 2007 for liquidation yet. All these costs are likely to increase with the magnitude of earnings manipulation. In this paper, I argue that the existence of such costs prevents earnings from being inflated to the point of uninformativeness. Due to information asymmetry surrounding an IPO, a low-quality firm has a natural tendency to overstate earnings so that it can be pooled with high-quality firms. Thus, to achieve separation, high-quality firms have an incentive to overstate earnings to a level that is prohibitively costly for a lower type to mimic. In equilibrium, rational investors realize that only a high-value firm could bear the cost of overstating earnings to such a high level and value the firm accordingly. In this sense, positive earnings management can be viewed as a signaling device to achieve separation.
An important question in any signaling model is whether the signal being examined would still be used if the firm had a portfolio of signals available. Most signaling models examine in isolation a somewhat arbitrary action by corporate insiders, showing that it has the required cost structure as in Spence (1973) or Riley (1975) for the existence of an information equilibrium. However, there seems to be little or no reason why firms would not use a mix of variables to signal firm value. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) are the first to study such a scenario in which a monopolist chooses advertising and price to signal his product quality at least cost. Engers (1987) argues that when multiple signals are used, the directional impacts of individual signals might be intertwined and the mix of signaling efforts will depend upon the relative power and costs of various signals available.
2 This study seeks to investigate how an IPO issuer can communicate private information to prospective investors at minimal cost by combining earnings management and ownership retention. It takes into account the interaction between the two signals and also addresses the efficiency of the two signals used. Characterization and comparative statics analysis of the resulting Pareto-dominant or efficient signaling equilibrium forms the basis of several empirical predictions.
Several papers have extended the basic framework of LP to examine other phenomena observed around initial public offerings. Hughes (1986) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) study the problem of IPO issuers trying to signal to investors both the mean and variance of the firm's future cash flows. Another signal, in addition to ownership retention, is needed to effectively communicate these two pieces of information. Hughes (1986) constructs a separating equilibrium in which an IPO issuer uses direct disclosure to disclose the expected value of the firm and uses ownership retention to signal the costs of such disclosure. In Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , the two signals are ownership retention and underpricing.
3 Datar et al. (1991) examine how the choice of auditor can be used together with ownership retention to communicate the issuer's private information to the market. The authors show that there exists a unique, stable separating equilibrium where each type of entrepreneur first separates himself from some of the other types by the quality of the auditor hired and the resulting audited report, and then from the remaining types through ownership retention.
This paper investigates features of the IPO issuer's cost-minimizing signaling portfolio, which involves combining earnings management and ownership retention. An interesting
The Accounting Review, January 2007 conclusion is that the high-type issuer actually values income-increasing earnings management as a signaling device, in addition to ownership retention. 4 Further, the model's simple yet intuitive framework permits derivation of several empirical implications regarding market efficiency, IPO pricing, and the strategic choice of earnings management, all of which can be easily taken to the data and tested on observable variables.
5 Through systematic econometric analysis, I confirm the major predictions of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the setting of the model and its underlying assumptions. Section III discusses various signaling devices. Section IV develops the full model. Section V develops empirical hypotheses and discusses key empirical proxies. Section VI to Section VIII carry out empirical tests for each hypothesis. Section IX summarizes the paper.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Consider a world with two-periods, period 0 and period 1, in which an IPO issuer takes a firm public by selling equity to a large group of investors at the end of period 0. The firm liquidates sometime after period 1 when all cash flows materialize. Without loss of generality, all variables are scaled so that the interest rate is 0. Earnings in each period are generated from that period's operations. Assume that in the absence of any manipulation, the period ''true'' earnings, e 0 , are the best predictor of period 1 ''true'' earnings, e 1 , and thus of the firm's liquidating dividends. In particular, assume that the firm's ''true'' earnings follow a random walk ẽ 1 ϭ e 0 ϩ with ϳ N(0, 2 ).
,
Investors hold well-diversified portfolios and are risk-neutral with respect to firmspecific risk, so they care only about the expected value of the liquidating dividends. , 2 negative exponential utility with a coefficient of absolute risk aversion b. He is averse to firm-specific risk and prefers to divest his equity holdings in the firm completely.
At the beginning of period 0, the issuer gets private information about e 0 (and thus about ) and reports current earnings as r in the prospectus. The reported earnings r need not equal the ''true'' earnings. The difference m ϭ r Ϫ e 0 is the amount of earnings inflation (or deflation, if m is negative), which transfers income from one period to another in a way that is not observed by investors. As argued before, such earnings manipulation is detrimental to value of the firm. Now let m ϭ r Ϫ e 0 ϭ r Ϫ denote the amount of earnings 2 management and let C(m) be the cost to the firm of such manipulation. I make the following assumptions regarding the functional form of C, which is common knowledge to all market participants: Information asymmetry plays an important role at the end of period 0 when the issuer announces the current accounting profit as r and offers a proportion (1 Ϫ ␣) of the firm to the public. The issuer seeks to maximize his expected utility given his private information about . Risk-neutral investors know 2 and all other relevant parameters and will purchase the offering if and only if they infer that the expected value is at least as high as the price. The equilibrium market price P is a function of observable actions, in particular, ownership retention ␣ and the reported earnings r (and all parameters of common knowledge). Further, let V(r; ) denote the value of the firm when the intrinsic value of the firm is and the reported earnings are r, then V(r; ) ϭ Ϫ Ϫ C r . 
ͩ ͪ
Since ϭ ␣V(r; ) ϩ (1 Ϫ ␣)P(␣, r) and ϭ ␣ 2 2 , the objective function be-
The problem faced by b 2 the issuer is thus to choose ␣ and r to maximize U (␣, r, P(␣, r) ; ), given his conjecture of the equilibrium pricing function P(␣, r) and his type .
Before characterizing the solution to the issuer's problem under asymmetric information, it is useful to note the solution under full information (i.e., in the case where investors observe firm type at time 0). When there is no information asymmetry, there is no need for the manager to signal through ownership retention or manipulation of earnings. Hence, the risk-averse issuer would truthfully report earnings and retain no share of the firm, i.e., the first best choice for the issuer would be ␣ FB ϭ 0 and r FB ϭ e 0 ϭ . 2
III. ANALYSIS OF UNIVARIATE SIGNALING Signaling through Ownership Retention Only
Suppose that the value of the firm is signaled solely through the level of ownership retention. The maximization problem faced by the issuer is:
6 C is increasing and convex in m because cheap manipulation is undertaken first. The assumption about the third derivative of C is needed only to get the sharp comparative statics result in Proposition 4. 7 To simplify the analysis, I assume that there is no market-wide risk. If market-wide risk exists, then the entrepreneur would hold a portfolio that compensates for any firm-specific risk borne as a result of the ownership retention by underweighting (overweighting) stocks that are positively (negatively) correlated with the firm. As shown in LP, where such is the setting, none of the conclusions about ␣ would change.
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Signaling through Reported Earnings Only
Here, I examine another special case: the issuer's fractional holdings are fixed at ␣ and so the firm value to outside investors is solely conveyed by reported earnings. For L , the benefit of overstating earnings is the increase in cash receipts for being valued as H instead of L for the (1 Ϫ ␣) share of the firm sold. The cost of over-reporting is that for the ␣ share of the firm under his ownership, the value of the firm would decrease by the cost of such over-reporting behavior. Hence, L would want to pretend to be H if Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of the proposition can be best illustrated by Figure 1 . In the figure, the dashed curve V m depicts the ''mimicking'' utility for L if L could trick the market into believing that it is H by overstating earnings to r H . When the high-type truthfully reports earnings, the mimicking utility of the low-type at point B is greater than its full-information value at point A. Only by over-reporting earnings to point C can the high-type effectively deter the low-type from mimicking its earnings report, because now the mimicking utility for the low-type is equal to its true value under symmetric information. Some features of the above signaling model are worthy of further discussion. First, notice that the observable signal here is the level of reported earnings, not the magnitude of earnings management, which is only correctly conjectured in equilibrium. In fact, earnings management represents the magnitude of deviation from the issuer's first best strategy-truthfully reporting earnings. In a typical signaling model, the marginal cost of signaling decreases with the favorableness of private information, and thus the better type sends a higher level of signal that is too costly for the lower type to mimic. In the current setting, the high-type firm has higher true earnings than does the low-type firm. Given that C(m) is convex, it is thus cost effective for the high-type firm to signal its quality by further increasing its reported earnings.
Second, notice that in the above setting, the exogenously fixed ownership retention (␣) plays a crucial role in determining the signaling cost and the nature of the resulting separating equilibrium. As earnings management is value-detrimental to the firm, a higher ␣ makes over-reporting earnings more costly to the issuer and, thus, the earnings report more credible. In fact, when ␣ is sufficiently large, the cost of earnings management is sufficient to deter L from mimicking the earnings report of H and truthful reporting constitutes an equilibrium. On the other hand, as is shown in the LP model, ␣ itself could also be a signaling device to convey the issuer's private information. However, unlike earnings management, ␣ does not affect the underlying firm value; it only imposes a personal cost on the risk-averse IPO issuer due to under-diversification. This suggests studying a general model that incorporates both ownership retention and reported earnings as endogenous signaling choices.
IV. THE GENERAL MODEL: MULTIVARIATE SIGNALING
I now consider the general model in which the IPO issuer simultaneously decides on both reported earnings and ownership retention to signal his private information. In this case, two interesting questions naturally arise: (1) Would the IPO issuer use both signals? (2) If so, then what determines the relative level of each signal used? I answer these questions in the framework of an efficient (or Pareto-dominant) signaling equilibrium in which the total signaling costs associated with the two signals are minimized. Using this equilibrium concept allows me to rule out equilibria with excessive, inefficient amounts of signaling by the better type firm (Milgrom and Roberts 1986) . As will be shown in the subsequent analysis, firms with valuable inside information would use both signals, and the efficient mix of the two signals depends on the uncertainty about the firm's future earnings.
When both reported earnings and ownership retention could be used as signaling devices, the issuer's objective function is:
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Solving for the Efficient Equilibrium of the Model
To solve for the efficient signaling equilibrium, the approach here is to construct the equilibrium for the restricted case of the two types of firms and then extrapolate. H has no incentive to mimic L , so L is not faced with any non-mimicry constraint and would select the first-best {␣, r}, bear no signaling cost, and be correctly valued as L in equilibrium. In other words, in the efficient signaling equilibrium, the strategies and beliefs in the model are defined as those that constitute a separating equilibrium, and are such that the dissipative costs of separation incurred are the least.
9 Thus, the efficient signaling equilibrium in the model emerges as the solution to the following non-mimicry problem faced by
The following proposition shows that in the optimal solution, ␣ Ͼ 0 and r Ͼ e H .
Proposition 3:
In the efficient signaling equilibrium, a high-type firm with valuable private information will both overstate earnings and retain more than the first-best level of ownership.
Proof. See Appendix.
To answer the second question of what determines the optimal mix of the two signals used, I use comparative statics analysis to examine how the equilibrium levels of ␣ and r change in response to changes in 2 . Figure 2 highlights the intuition and the mathematical proof is deferred to the Appendix. In Figure 2 , the two thick solid curves depict the isocost curves for the high-type with and respectively, where Ͻ 10 The two dashed 2 2 2 2 ,
curves depict the non-mimicry constraints in Equation (6) where the iso-cost curve for the high-type and the non-mimicry constraint for the low-type are tangent to each other. The graph illustrates that two effects take place as 2 increases. First, the non-mimicry constraint rotates inward, reflecting the fact that as the costs of retaining ownership increase,
The Accounting Review, January 2007 the high-type can retain a smaller proportion of equity to deter the low-type's mimicking attempt without changing reported earnings. This is reflected as a horizontal shift from point A to point B. Point B, however, will not be the optimal signaling portfolio choice for the high-type due to a second effect: as 2 increases, retaining ownership becomes relatively costlier for both types of issuers, but more so for the high-type than for the low-type since the high-type has lower marginal costs in overstating earnings, i.e., Ͻ . Thus, to make
the iso-cost curve tangent with the non-mimicry constraint, the optimal cost-minimizing signaling portfolio requires a further reduction in ownership retention and a simultaneous increase in reported earnings, resulting in a move from point B to point C. Taken together, the two effects unambiguously reduce ownership retention and increase reported earnings, as generalized by the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Ceteris paribus, an increase in 2 will lead to a decrease in ownership retention, ␣, and an increase in reported earnings, r.
Fan The Accounting Review, January 2007
To summarize, as 2 increases, retaining more ownership becomes relatively costlier for the risk-averse issuer. Hence, to achieve differentiation at minimal cost, the issuer of a high-value firm would retain less ownership, and resort more to earnings management.
V. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL PROXIES Empirical Hypotheses
The above theoretical analysis generates several empirical implications, which can be classified into three categories. First, the model depicts a situation where income-increasing earnings management emerges as a rational-expectations equilibrium outcome. As such, exaggerated earnings will not be sustained in the long run, the firm's future operating performance would decline relative to its peak level in the issuing period. If the estimated discretionary accruals properly measures the amount of earnings management, i.e., it captures the temporarily inflated portion in reported earnings, then estimated discretionary accruals should predict the magnitude of such decline. On the other hand, since in equilibrium, investors rationally anticipate earnings management and factor it into the IPO price, they should not be surprised by the post-issue performance decline caused by the reversal of discretionary accruals. If properly estimated long-run abnormal stock returns captures the correction of investors' valuation errors over time, then there should be no systematic relationship between the issue period discretionary accruals and the post-issue long run abnormal stock returns. This leads to my first empirical hypothesis: 11 H1a: IPO firms engage in earnings management to increase income during the issuing period.
H1b: Discretionary accruals in the issuing period predict post-issue deterioration in IPO firms' operating performance, but do not predict post-issue abnormal stock returns.
Second, within the context of my model, the IPO issuer optimally employs two signals, the percentage of retained ownership and reported earnings, to distinguish its type from all lesser types that could not have mimicked it along both dimensions. This in turn implies that, in the efficient signaling equilibrium, rational investors would view both accounting earnings and ownership retention as valuable signals of firm type and price both positively, which leads to my second empirical hypothesis: H2: Both accounting earnings and ownership retention are positively priced in the IPO market.
Third, comparative statics analysis shows that, in the efficient signaling equilibrium, the level of the two signals should be chosen simultaneously to minimize the cost of signaling firm value. Ceteris paribus, riskier IPO firms would choose to retain less ownership, but manage earnings to a greater extent to achieve separation. This leads to my third empirical hypothesis:
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Sample and Empirical Proxies
The full sample is downloaded from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database and consists of 2,629 firm-commitment initial public offerings taking place in the years 1987 to 1997. The sample period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) is chosen for the following reasons. First, as my sample of IPO firms starts after 1986, I can directly calculate accruals from the cash flow statement using post-SFAS No. 95 data to avoid the measurement error associated with the balance sheet approach (Collins and Hribar 2002) . Second, as suggested by Ritter and Welch (2002) , many IPO phenomena are sample and time-period specific. As IPOs during the TWW sample (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) and TWR sample (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) clearly have poorer long-run returns than those in my sample period, 12 it is thus interesting to examine whether their results still hold in more recent years with different economic conditions. The sample period is largely non-overlapping with those used in TWW and TWR and also avoids the Internet IPO wave years. I define the fiscal year in which the IPO took place as the event year (year 0) and all other years are identified relatively. To allow for a reporting lag, the multiyear event window for the abnormal stock return performance begins four months after the fiscal year-end of year 0. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. To be included in the sample, an IPO must have an offer price of at least $1 and market capitalization of at least $20 million (in 1997 prices) as calculated immediately after the offering. Unit offerings, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) offerings (SDC Industry Code RI), offerings related to ADRs (SDC Security Type 847, 8470, 964, 804, 845, and 6138), regulated utility firms (SIC code between 4910 and 4939, inclusive) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, inclusive) are excluded. SDC also provides information on dates of lock-up expirations and percentages of shares locked up as well as information about underwriters and auditors. Since data on the founding date for IPO firms are very limited on SDC, I obtain information on the founding year from Jay Ritter's IPO website.
13 I calculate IPO firm age at the time of offering as the difference between the issue-year and the founding year. I also obtain underwriter rankings from the above website for the lead underwriters for each of the IPO firms in my sample. Stock return data and financial accounting data are obtained from CRSP and Compustat, respectively.
Using information from the above sources, I construct the following empirical proxies: Ownership retention (␣): Consistent with prior studies (Downes and Heinkel 1982; Feltham et al. 1991) , retained ownership is measured by the number of shares held by owners prior to the new issue (adjusted by secondary offerings) divided by total shares outstanding after the new issue.
14 In other words: 12 The average three-year cumulative abnormal returns adjusted by value-weighted market index is Ϫ18.9 percent in the TWW sample, versus Ϫ7.2 percent in my sample (Table 5 ). 13 http: / / bear.cba.ufl.edu / ritter / ipodata.htm. 14 Many IPO firms had issued stock to employees, venture capital firms, insurance companies, and other private investors prior to going public, making it hard to identify the ''issuer'' in the modeling context. Thus, consistent with prior studies (Downes and Heinkel 1982; Feltham et al. 1991) , I make the assumption that all parties owning the firm's stock prior to the public offering were insiders or, in the current model, issuers.
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For the full sample of firms, the mean percentage of retained ownership is 67.5 percent (Table 1 , Panel B), with the .95 and .05 percentiles of ␣ being 34.2 percent and 87.5 percent. There is little variation across years or industries. In general, even if there is a sharp decline in ownership after the IPO, the post-offering stake is still substantial.
Earnings management (m): Consistent with prior literature, discretionary accruals estimated from the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) are used as the primary measure of earnings management. The estimation procedure is as follows. First, total accruals are calculated directly from the statement of cash flows (annual Compustat data items are indicated parenthetically), as suggested by Collins and Hribar (2002) :
it where:
EBXI ϭ earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; and CFO ϭ cash flow from continuing operations.
15
The expected accruals under the modified Jones model is measured by:
where:
ACC it ϭ total accruals (#123 Ϫ (#308 Ϫ #124)) for sample firm i in year t; TA itϪ1 ϭ total assets (#6) for sample firm i in year tϪ1; ⌬REV it ϭ change in net revenues (#12) for sample firm i over year t; ⌬REC it ϭ change in accounts receivable (#2) for sample firm i over year t; and GPPE it ϭ gross property, plant, and equipment (#7) for firm i in year t.
Ordinary least squares is used to obtain industry-specific estimates of the coefficients, i.e., for each firm-year in the IPO sample, the model parameters a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 are estimated using a contemporaneous estimation sample of all two-digit SIC code peers in the same fiscal year but excluding firms within ‫2ע‬ years of IPO/SEO offerings. More specifically, I estimate the following model by year and industry:
Discretionary accruals (as percentage of lagged total assets, TA itϪ1 ) for IPO firm i for year t are represented by:
where and are the estimates of a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 from the annual cross-sectional twoa ,â ,â 0 1 2 digit SIC industry regression (10). Discretionary accruals models based on the Jones or modified Jones model have been widely criticized for producing noisy measures of earnings management. Dechow et al.
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The Accounting Review, January 2007 (1995) find that the modified Jones model is severely misspecified for firm-periods experiencing nonrandom performance, in that firms with extremely high (low) earnings tend to have positive (negative) accrual prediction errors. McNichols (2000) also shows that discretionary accruals from the commonly used Jones or modified Jones model are correlated with long-term earnings growth. Using a general econometric framework, McNichols and Wilson (1988) show that the correlation between the measurement error in discretionary accruals and the partitioning variable of interest could generate biased results in testing for the presence of earning management. As a nonrandom sample, IPO firms are likely to experience strong earnings performance and are strongly tilted toward small-growth firms, which suggests that at the time of the IPO, we could observe a positive mean accruals prediction error even if the null hypothesis of no earnings is true. It has also been argued that IPO firms time their offerings to coincide with periods of peak performance and favorable stock market conditions, i.e., when the market is likely to overvalue IPOs (see, for example, Ritter 1991; Jain and Kini 1994) . Hence, the post-issue decline in operating and stock performance of IPO firms that TWW and TWR attribute to the reversal of earnings management is also potentially confounded by the correlation between performance and the measurement error in discretionary accruals.
To mitigate such possible inference bias resulting from the correlation between measurement error in discretionary accruals and the variables of interest, I adopt an industryand performance-matching approach to calculate an adjusted discretionary accruals measure, similar to that suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) . More specifically, each IPO firmyear observation (from year 0 to year 4) is matched with a non-issuing firm in the same industry, and with similar return on assets during the same fiscal year. The matching process is started on the four-digit SIC code level, i.e., I first select a firm with the closest return on assets (ROA) to the IPO firm's ROA. If the percentage difference in this measure between the sample firm and the control firm is greater than 20 percent, I move to the threedigit SIC level to find the closest match. If the percentage difference is still greater than 20 percent, I move to the two-digit SIC level, and finally to the one-digit SIC level to find the closest match. 17 The discretionary accruals for nonsample firms are estimated as the residuals from the annual cross-sectional two-digit SIC industry regression (10) using all Compustat observations in 1987-2001 but excluding firms already represented in the IPO sample.
18 The performance-matched discretionary accruals (ADJDAC it ) for sample firm i and year t are calculated as the difference between DAC it from the modified Jones model and the corresponding discretionary accruals of a performance-matched firm in year t. I denote such performance-adjusted discretionary accruals estimates as ADJDAC it .
Uncertainty regarding future earnings ( 2 ): To be consistent with the theoretical model, an ideal proxy is one that represents the ex ante uncertainty about firm-specific variations in the future value of the firm, which should be common knowledge to all market participants prior to the offering. Various ex ante risk measures have been used in the 17 The above matching procedure is able to obtain close matches for the majority of IPO firms. Of all IPO sample firm-year observations, 58.7 percent are matched on three-digit SIC codes, and 73.1 percent are matched on at least two-digit SIC codes. 59.3 percent of the matched firms' ROAs are within 80 percent to 120 percent of the IPO firms' ROAs. The t-statistic for the difference in means of the two distributions is not statistically significant. 18 A total of 1,110 annual cross-sectional regressions and 181,575 Compustat observations in the annual full coverage, industry, and research files from 1987-2001 are used. To mitigate the effect of outliers, for each annual cross-sectional industry regression, all variables are trimmed at the top and bottom 1 percent. I also eliminate from each regression all influential observations with one of the following conditions: absolute value of DFFITS greater than 2, absolute value of STUDENT greater than 2, and COOKD greater than 1, per Belsley et al. (1980) .
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literature, for example, the number of items listed in prospectus under the caption ''risk factors'' (Simunic and Stein 1987) and the standard deviation of net income in the pre-IPO years (Copley and Douthett 2002) . However, since SDC does not provide the number of risk factors and since Compustat does not have enough pre-IPO time-series information, these proxies are not feasible here. Some other studies employ as an ex post risk proxy the standard deviation of daily returns for the year or so after the IPO (Carter et al. 1998) . Although this market-based proxy is more closely aligned with the conventional perception of investment risk, it includes ex post information that is not known at the time of the IPO, and could potentially generate biased inference. To get a cleaner proxy for ex ante expected risk, I construct a market-based ex ante measure of firm-specific risk using a matchedsample approach similar to that used by Lowry and Shu (2002) . More specifically, for each IPO firm, I first identify all firms with the same three-digit SIC code and market capitalization ranging between 80 percent and 120 percent of the IPO firm, where the market capitalization of both the IPO firm and the control firms is measured at the close of the IPO firm's first trading day. I then calculate the average of the standard deviations of daily stock returns for the matched sample over the one year prior to the IPO. 19 To the extent that the return volatilities of similar firms should be correlated, this measure should provide an estimate of the IPO firm's future uncertainty based on common information at the offering. Indeed, in my sample, the correlation between such an ex ante measure and the ex post volatility of IPO firms' daily stock returns is significantly positive (the Pearson and Spearman correlations are 0.23 and 0.29 respectively, and both are highly significant with a two-tailed p-value Ͻ 0.001).
VI. TESTS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY: H1a AND H1b Discretionary Accruals and Post-Issue Changes in Various Performance Measures
First, I examine the time-series profile of discretionary accruals and various performance measures for my IPO sample. Panel A in Table 2 reports the mean and median discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals from the issue-year to four years after. DAC t denotes discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones model and ADJDAC t denotes performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, where t ϭ 1 to 4 denotes the fiscal year relative to the event year (year 0). To reduce the effect of a few large outliers on the mean statistic, in both panels, the means are obtained after trimming the data at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The largest DAC t occurs in year 0, with both mean (3.76 percent of lagged assets) and median (1.69 percent of lagged assets) being highly statistically significant. It then declines over time and eventually becomes significantly negative after year 3.
Compared to DAC t , ADJDAC t shows a similar pattern. The top and bottom 1 percent trimmed mean (median) issue-year ADJDAC 0 is 2.62 percent (1.71 percent) of lagged assets, and is highly statistically significant. Both the mean and median ADJDAC t decline over time and become significantly negative in year 3. Such evidence is consistent with managers advancing accruals to increase reported net income in the issue-year.
Panel B in Table 2 reports the time-series distribution from the issue-year to four years after for three accounting measures of operating performance: operating income per dollar of sales (OISALES), profit margin (PFMARGIN), and return on assets (ROA). Similar to Loughran and Ritter (1995) , these three measures are defined as follows: *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, two-tailed, based on T distribution for means, Wilcoxon for median. The means are trimmed at the top and bottom 1 percent. Panel A presents the time-series profile of DAC t and ADJDAC t , i.e., discretionary accruals and performanceadjusted discretionary accruals estimated from cash flows statement using the modified Jones model. To generate the industry-and performance-matched control samples, each IPO firm-year is matched with an industry nonissuing peer with the closest to within 80 percent and 120 percent of the IPO firm's return on assets. The matching procedure begins from the same four-digit SIC codes, and when no match is found, firms with the same three-digit, then two-digit, and finally one-digit SIC codes are used. Performance-adjusted discretionary accruals are the discretionary accruals of the IPO firm minus the discretionary accruals of the matched firm. Panel B presents the time-series profile of various operating performance measures. More specifically: OISALES t ϭ operating income before depreciation (#13) in year t / sales in year t (#12); PFMARGIN t ϭ net income in year t (#172) / sales in year t (#12); and ROA t ϭ net income before extraordinary items in year t (#18) / assets of year tϪ1 (#6).
OISALES t ϭ operating income before depreciation (#13) in year t/sales in year t (#12); 20
PFMARGIN t ϭ net income in year t (#172)/sales in year t (#12); and ROA t ϭ net income before extraordinary items in year t (#18)/assets of year tϪ1 (#6).
Because of the influence of outliers on the means and skewness in the distribution of the accounting ratios (Barber and Lyon 1996) , I report median values and significance levels based on nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. In Panel B of Table 2 , the first row under each operating performance measure label reports the corresponding raw performance 20 Loughran and Ritter (1995) deflate operating income by total assets, which includes interest-earning short-term investments that many issuers temporarily invest some IPO proceeds in prior to investing in operating assets. To be consistent with such an asset deflator, Loughran and Ritter (1995) add interest income (Compustat data item #62) to operating income before depreciation (#13). However, as I deflate operating income by total sales, I exclude interest income from the operating income measure.
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measures. For the median issuer, ROA decreases to 1.53 percent four years after the offering relative to 8.32 percent in the year of the offering. Median profit margin (PFMARGIN) declines from 4.24 percent in the offering year to 1.10 percent four years after the offering. One drawback of the above two operating performance measures, however, is that they are affected by a change in the issuing firm's assets-in-place and/or interest expenses, 21 whereas operating income per dollar of sales (OISALES) is not. OISALES declines from 12.41 percent in the issuing year to 8.70 percent four years subsequent to the offering, again confirming that operating performance deteriorates following the IPO.
The above evidence shows that IPO issuers in general experience a substantial operating performance decline in the years following the offering. Next, I directly examine whether the decline in post-issue operating performance of IPO firms differs systematically according to the magnitude of the IPO-year discretionary accruals. If the issuer uses discretionary accruals to shift income from the future, then I expect a negative relationship between the two. To test this prediction, I sort IPO firms by their issue-year discretionary accruals into five portfolios and examine the post-issue change in various operating performance measures in cross section. The summary measures of the average post-issue change in OISALES, PFMARGIN, and ROA corresponding to the three-year horizon after the issue are constructed as follows:
To avoid the spurious correlation between issue-year discretionary accruals and postissue change in operating performance that might arise when the changes are measured relative to year 0, I calculate the post-issue change in operating performance relative to year Ϫ1 under each operating performance measure. 22 Because year Ϫ2 total assets is generally not available in Compustat, in calculating the ROA of year Ϫ1 I deflate (ROA* ),
Ϫ1
year Ϫ1 net income (#18) by year Ϫ1 total assets (#6). The first row in Table 3 under each operating performance measure label presents the average post-issue decline in the corresponding performance measure relative to year Ϫ1 across the five issue-year discretionary accruals (DAC 0 ) portfolios, with Q5 being the most aggressive earnings management portfolio (largest DAC 0 ), and Q1 being the least aggressive earnings management portfolio (smallest DAC 0 ). All three measures exhibit a monotonic decrease from Q1 to Q5. The medians of the three measures are significantly positive in Q1 and then drop to a significantly negative level in Q5. The difference between Q1 and Q5 is highly statistically significant based on the Wilcoxon z-statistic for median. The second row in Table 3 under each operating performance measure label shows very similar results when quintiles are formed based on the issue-year performance-adjusted discretionary accruals measure (ADJDAC 0 ). 21 Untabulated evidence shows that there is a sharp increase in total assets for the sample IPO firms in the issueyear. 22 In untabulated results, I find that when post-issue change in operating performance is measured relative to year 0, the predictive power of issue-year discretionary accruals is stronger in both magnitude and statistical significance. 
where is calculated as year Ϫ1 net income (#18) over total assets at the beginning of year 0.
ROA* Ϫ1
To better control for other factors that might cause the post-issue decline in operating performance, I also regress the average decline of ROA in the three post-issue-years relative to year Ϫ1 (⌬ROA 3 ) on the issue-year discretionary accruals (DAC 0 ), with the average capital expenditure in year 0 and year 1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 0 (CAPEXP 01 ) and change in cash flows from year Ϫ1 to year 0 scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 0 (CHCFO 0 ) included as additional control variables. 23 If IPO firms use the IPO proceeds to make investments that benefit long-run operating performance, then capital expenditures surrounding the issuing period would induce a mechanical decline in post-issue earnings (Rangan 1998) . I therefore include asset-scaled average capital expenditures in year 0 and year 1 (CAPEXP 01 ) as an explanatory variable in the regression. If IPO firms time their offerings to coincide with periods of peak performance (Jain and Kini 1994) that cannot be sustained in the long run, then deterioration in operating performance will be observed subsequent to the issue, even in the absence of earnings management. Therefore, the asset-scaled year 0 change in cash flows (CHCFO 0 ) is included as an additional explanatory variable to mitigate potential spurious correlation between discretionary 23 To mitigate the effect of outliers, in this and subsequent regressions (except the calendar-time portfolio regressions), I truncate the top and bottom 1 percent observations in each variable (except the indicator variables). I also exclude potential influential observations identified by any of the following conditions per Belsley et al. (1980) : absolute value of DFFITS is greater than 2, absolute value of STUDENT is greater than 2, and COOKD is greater than 1. CAPEXP 01 ϭ average capital expenditure (#128) in year 0 and year 1, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the issue year (year 0); and CHCFO 0 ϭ change in cash flows (#308 Ϫ #124) from year Ϫ1 to year 0, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 0 (#6); where is calculated as year Ϫ1 net income (#18) over total assets at the beginning of year 0. ROA* Ϫ1 accruals and future changes in operating performance induced by contemporaneous correlations between the discretionary accruals and change in cash flows in the IPO year. The first column in Table 4 reports the result of regressing ⌬ROA 3 on DAC 0 , CAPEXP 01 , and CHCFO 0 . The coefficient on DAC 0 is negative and statistically significant. The second column in Table 4 reports the result of regressing ⌬ROA 3 on ADJDAC 0 , CAPEXP 01 , and CHCFO 0 . It shows that similar results hold when the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (ADJDAC 0 ) is used. The coefficient on ADJDAC 0 remains highly statistically significant.
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To summarize, consistent with the prediction of H1a, operating performance of IPO firms deteriorates on both an absolute and relative basis subsequent to the issue-year. The patterns are consistent with IPO firms advancing accruals to increase reported net income in the issuing period. Subsequently, the reversal in post-issue accruals causes a post-IPO decline in earnings. These results are robust with respect to alternative measures of earnings management and operating performance. 
Discretionary Accruals and Post-Issue Abnormal Stock Returns
Given the above evidence, I next examine whether the market is surprised when earnings declines related to discretionary accruals take place in the post-issue period. To measure long-term abnormal stock returns, I need an estimator of abnormal performance and a means for determining the distribution of the estimator, both are much debated issues in the asset-pricing literature. Thus, the approach here is to use alternative methodologies (event-time portfolio analysis, calendar-time portfolio analysis) and alternative measures of computing abnormal returns (buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns, with and without rebalancing) with a variety of benchmarks (raw, market-adjusted, Fama and French [1993] adjusted).
Event-Time Portfolio Analysis
Under this approach, I first sort the sample firms into quintiles based on issue-year discretionary accruals (DAC 0 ). Q5 is the most aggressive earnings management portfolio (largest DAC 0 ), and Q1 is the most conservative earnings management portfolio (smallest DAC 0 ). The average three-year post-issue abnormal returns calculated using alternative methods and relative to different benchmarks are then computed for each quintile and examined for systematic variation across the quintiles. A monotonic decrease in the riskadjusted returns from the lowest to the highest quintile provides evidence consistent with the ability of issue-year discretionary accruals to predict post-issue stock returns.
As the data attrition rate of my IPO sample is on average 9 percent per year, I follow the procedure outlined in Shumway and Warther (1999) to correct for the delisting bias documented in prior studies (Shumway 1997) . More specifically, when firms delist but the return is missing, I assume that delisting for ''negative'' reasons as judged by the delisting code results in a return of Ϫ30 percent for NYSE/AMEX firms and a return of Ϫ55 percent for Nasdaq firms. To comprehensively measure investor experiences, I calculate buy-andhold (cumulative) raw and abnormal stock returns with and without portfolio rebalancing. This is done for two reasons. First, it is widely documented that long-run returns are sensitive to the computation method (Barber and Lyon 1997; Kothari and Warner 1997) . Second, even though no rebalancing might represent the experience of individual naive investors who make portfolio-allocation choices infrequently, large institutional investors, a particularly important group of investors for IPO firms (Field and Lowry 2004) , trade frequently and monthly portfolio rebalancing may be the relevant benchmark. 24 Table 5 reports the means of raw and abnormal returns relative to alternative benchmark returns (i.e., CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted market return indices) with and without monthly portfolio rebalancing across the issue-year discretionary accruals quintiles. Notice that even though there is difference in long-run stock returns between Q1 and Q5, the mean abnormal stock returns does not monotonically decrease from Q1 to Q5. Contrary to the hypothesis that the investors are surprised by post-issue decline in operating performance caused by the reversion of discretionary accruals, the most aggressive earnings management portfolio (Q5) rarely has the lowest abnormal returns and the most conservative earnings management portfolio (Q1) rarely has the highest abnormal returns. In fact, 24 In calculating portfolio buy-and-hold (cumulative) returns without rebalancing, I compound (sum) individual IPO firm's stock returns over time and then calculate the portfolio average of individual firm's compounded (summed) returns. Because of delisting, not all sample firms have a full three years of valid return data. I fill in missing sample firm returns with the benchmark returns. In calculating portfolio returns with monthly rebalancing, for each month, I first calculate the portfolio average of the constituent sample firms' monthly returns and then compound (sum) the monthly average portfolio returns over time. This procedure mimics a trading strategy that rebalances the portfolio monthly, assigning equal weight to those stocks still in existence. The holding period is five to 40 months after the fiscal year-end of the IPO issue year. Quintile 1 firms are most conservative (smallest issue year discretionary accruals) and Quintile 5 firms are most aggressive (largest issue year discretionary accruals). Due to cross-sectional correlation problems, t-statistics are not reported here since they cannot be translated into p-values. I follow the procedure outlined in Shumway and Warther (1999) to correct for the delisting bias. More specifically, when firms delist but the return is missing, I assume delisting for ''negative'' reasons as judged by the delisting code results in a return of Ϫ30 percent for NYSE / AMEX firms and a return of Ϫ55 percent for Nasdaq firms. In calculating portfolio buy-and-hold (cumulative) returns without rebalancing, I compound (sum) individual IPO firms' stock returns over time and then calculate the portfolio average of individual firms' compounded (summed) returns. Because of delisting, not all sample firms have a full three years of valid return data, I fill in missing sample firm returns with the benchmark returns. In other words:
BH T (portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return) ϭ
where r it and m it are monthly raw and benchmark returns for firm i and month t, and N is the number of firms. Quintile (abnormal) returns are averages of the constituent firm (abnormal) returns. In calculating portfolio returns with monthly rebalancing, for each month, I first calculate the portfolio average of the constituent sample firms' monthly returns and then compound (sum) the monthly average portfolio returns over time. This procedure mimics a trading strategy that rebalances the portfolio monthly, assigning equal weight to those stocks still in existence. In other words:
BH T (portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return) ϭ (1 ϩ r it ) Ϫ (1 ϩ m t );
where r it and m it are monthly raw and benchmark returns for firm i and month t, and N is the number of surviving firms in month t. Quintile (abnormal) returns are averages of the constituent firm (abnormal) returns.
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The Accounting Review, January 2007 there is often an increase in abnormal stock returns from Q1 to Q2, and an increase from Q4 to Q5. Q4 often turns out to be the worst-performing portfolio.
Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression Analysis
As Fama (1998) points out, the buy-and-hold returns, while conceptually more representative of an investor's investment experience, do not adequately control for crosssectional correlation among individual firms and are, therefore, likely to yield overstated tstatistics in event-time regressions where the post-offering stock returns are regressed on issue-year discretionary accruals in event time. Test statistics calculated from buy-and-hold returns are also misspecified due to the severe skewness of the distribution of buy-andhold returns in many studies.
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Notice that cross-sectional dependence is of paramount concern in this study since my sample of over 2,600 IPO events is certainly affected by calendar-time clustering and substantial overlapping of the post-IPO horizons. An alternative approach to measuring the long-term stock price performance is to track the performance of quintile DAC 0 portfolios in calendar time relative to either an explicit asset-pricing model or some other benchmark (Fama 1998) . Under this approach, cross-correlations of event-firm abnormal returns are automatically accounted for in the portfolio variance. Also, skewness is no longer an issue as this approach uses monthly portfolio returns.
Under this approach, quintiles are formed for each month based on issue-year discretionary accruals measured from May 1988 through January 2002 by sorting all sample firms whose three-year stock return event window starts in the previous 36 months. The calendar-time portfolios are rebalanced monthly to reflect the changing portfolio composition, i.e., dropping all companies that just reached the end of their three-year event windows and adding all new companies that just started their three-year event windows. The equal-weighted returns are then computed for each quintile. To control for the difference in the risk exposure across the quintiles, I regress the monthly quintile returns (in excess of risk-free rate) on the three Fama and French (1993) factors, as in the following equation:
where R ƒt is the 30-day T-bill yield in month and the three factors (defined in Table 6 ) are obtained from Kenneth French's website.
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The regressions are carried out separately for each quintile. Because the portfolio in any given month may contain from 1 to over 900 firms, I estimate the regression using weighted least squares to mitigate heteroscedasticity, where the weight is the square root of the number of firms in each month (Franks et al. 1991) . If the Fama-French model provides a complete description of expected returns, then the intercepts are expected to be 0 if DAC 0 has no effect. Thus, any significant differences between the intercepts of the aggressive and conservative discretionary accruals portfolios are attributed to differences in issue-year discretionary accruals. Table 6 reports the estimated intercepts and other coefficients with the associated tstatistics. The intercepts from the Fama-French three-factor regression are insignificant for all quintiles. Further, even though the intercept of the aggressive quintile is lower than that of the conservative quintile, the difference is not significant based on the two-tailed p-value. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (for a two-sided test), respectively. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient estimate. The table presents time-series weighted least squares regression coefficients from the following regression, with weight being the square root of the number of firms in each calendar month:
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where R pt is the equally weighted portfolio returns in calendar month t; R ft is the 30-day T-bill yield in month t; R mt is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index; SMB t is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms; and HML t is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t. Quintiles are formed for each month from May of 1988 to December of 2001 by sorting all sample firms that have issued equity in the previous 12 to 48 months based on DAC 0 . The t-statistic for a p (Q5)-a p (Q1) in the table is from the intercept in an (unreported) equivalent regression of the difference between the conservative and aggressive portfolio returns on the factor returns.
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The estimated difference in intercepts between the conservative and aggressive portfolios and associated t-statistics is obtained from an unreported time-series regression of the difference in returns between the conservative and aggressive portfolios on the factor returns. The calculated abnormal returns differential between the most aggressive and most conservative discretionary accruals portfolios is 0.56 percent per month, implying an annual return differential of 6.72 percent (0.56 percent * 12). Table 6 also shows the calendar-time portfolio regression results when the issue-year performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (ADJDAC 0 ) is used to determine the portfolio formation. No monotonically declining pattern from Q1 to Q5 is discernable. The statistical and economic significance of the abnormal return differential between the conservative (Q1) and aggressive portfolio (Q5) is further reduced. The two-tailed p-value for the difference in intercepts between the aggressive and conservative earnings management portfolios is 0.40, and the annual abnormal returns differential is 3.6 percent (0.30 percent * 12).
To summarize, even though Section VI shows that there is strong evidence that the issue-year discretionary accruals predict the post-issue deterioration in IPO firms' operating performance measures, there is no strong evidence that discretionary accruals estimated from cash flow statement and post-issue abnormal stock returns are negatively correlated. Performance matching further weakens the statistical and economic significance of the relationship between the two. This lack of intertemporal and methodological robustness diminishes our confidence in TWW and TWR's conclusion that the market is misled by income-increasing accrual management in the IPO year.
VII. TESTS OF IPO PRICING: H2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that both reported earnings and ownership retention should be positively priced by investors in valuing IPO firms. To test this hypothesis, I employ an empirical formulation that is motivated by the model and intuition of Ohlson (1995) and Downes and Heinkel (1982) . I posit that the initial market value of equity is a function of net income, the book value of equity, the ownership retention signal, and the total gross proceeds raised during the IPO process.
To set the stage, I first run OLS regressions according to the following empirical formulation:
V i ϭ market value of IPO firm i immediately after the offering, calculated as total number of shares outstanding after the offer multiplied by closing price on the first day of trading; ␣ i ϭ ownership retention measure as defined in Section V; Net Income i ϭ IPO firm i's net income before extraordinary items (#123 from Cash Flow Statement) in year Ϫ1; Book Value i ϭ IPO firm i's book value of equity (#60) in year Ϫ1; and Gross Proceeds i ϭ offer price multiplied by total number of primary shares issued.
Only firms with positive pre-offering book values are included in the regression. To mitigate the effect of heteroscedasticity and scale bias, I also use weighted least squares
The Accounting Review, January 2007 *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (for a two-sided test), respectively. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient estimate. To reduce the influence of outliers, all variables in the regressions are trimmed at top and bottom 1 percent. I also eliminate from each regression all influential observations meeting one of the following conditions: absolute value of DFFITS greater than 2, absolute value of STUDENT greater than 2, or COOKD greater than 2 (Belsley et al. 1980 ). Variable Definitions: The dependent variable is V i , which is market value of the IPO firm i immediately after the offering, calculated as total number of shares outstanding after the offer * closing price on the first day of trading. The independent variables are: with weight being the total revenue in year Ϫ1 to re-estimate the above empirical formulation. Table 7 shows that the coefficients on Net Income and Ownership Retention (␣) are significantly positive in all regression specifications.
In summary, consistent with H2, for the sample of IPO firms examined here, there is strong evidence that both ownership retention and Net Income are significantly positively related to IPO valuation.
VIII. TESTS OF THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
AND OWNERSHIP RETENTION: H3 I test H3 by the following system of equations with discretionary accruals and retained ownership as dependent variables, each modeled as a function of the other signal, the ex ante risk measure (STDRET), and a set of control variables. More specifically, for the regression of ownership retention: 
and for the regression of earnings management regression:
27 lgALPHA ϭ logit transformation of ownership retention ␣ (defined in Section V), i.e., lgALPHA ϭ log(␣/(1 Ϫ ␣));
28
DAC 0 ϭ discretionary accruals estimated from the Modified Jones model; STDRET ϭ average standard deviation of daily stock returns of the industry-and sizematched control sample over the year prior to the IPO, as defined in Section V; UnderP ϭ IPO underpricing, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; LEV ϭ IPO firm's leverage ratio at the beginning of the IPO year, which equals 1 minus the ratio of book value of equity (#60) to total assets (#6); ACCSALES ϭ issue-year total accruals per dollar of sales, where total accruals is measured as ACC ϭ EBXI (#123) Ϫ CFO (#308 Ϫ #124), as in Section V; CAPEXP 01 ϭ average capital expenditure (#128) in year 0 and year 1, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the issue-year (year 0); lgAge ϭ log(1 ϩ IPO Age), where IPO firm age is calculated as the difference between the founding year and IPO issue-year; UWrank ϭ a ranking of the reputation of the lead underwriter on a 0-9 scale following Carter et al. (1998) , 9 being the highest;
29
Auditor ϭ indicator variable for auditor reputation, which equals 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 5 (Big 6) auditors; VCdum ϭ indicator variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is backed by venture capital (VC); and Hitech ϭ indicator variable from SDC that equals 1 if the IPO firm is in the high-tech industry, and 0 otherwise.
The key variable of interest in this context is STDRET. According to H3, as the risk of the IPO firm increases, it becomes relatively costlier for the risk-averse issuer to retain 27 Compustat data item are included in parentheses. 28 Because the ratio variable ␣ is bounded by 0 and 1 and is highly skewed, logit transformation is used to normalize the distribution. 29 The ranking is obtained from Jay Ritter's website, which is constructed for the 1992-2000 period. When an IPO issuer has multiple lead underwriters, the average ranking is used instead.
shares of the IPO firm, and the issuer will substitute earnings management for ownership retention so as to communicate his private information at minimal cost. To test this crosssectionally, however, one would have to control for other effects that are not explicitly modeled in the restricted theoretical setting. Starting with the ownership retention regression, underpricing (UnderP) is included as a control variable in the ownership retention regression as prior literature suggests that it is an important determinant of post-IPO ownership structure. For example, Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that issuers underprice their firms at the IPO to induce oversubscription, which allows the firm to discriminate against large blockholders in the allocation of shares. In their theoretical model of IPOs, Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) show that, holding the riskiness of the firm constant, ownership retention and underpricing are positively correlated. Beatty (1989) also empirically confirms a positive and significant relationship between retained ownership and underpricing. According to the pecking-order theory of capital structure (Myers and Majluf 1984) , firms prefer internal finance to external finance and debt finance to equity finance. Hence, a high-growth firm may be forced to finance its investment decisions by equity instead of retained earnings or debt. I use the IPO firm's asset-scaled average capital expenditure in year 0 and year 1 (CAPEXP 01 ) as a growth proxy and therefore I predict that CAPEXP 01 should be negatively related with ownership retention. Relatedly, limited debt capacity may motivate the firm to raise more equity through the IPO process. Hence, I predict that IPO firms with higher pre-IPO leverage ratios will have lower post-IPO ownership retention. Underwriter rank (UWrank) is included to control for the investment bank's reputation in facilitating shareholders' selling. As VCs might take IPOs as an exit opportunity to realize their stake in the firm, I predict that VC backing is associated with less ownership retention. I also include lgAge, a high-tech industry dummy (Hitech) and a set of IPO-year dummies to control for systematic differences in firm characteristics and time-period differences.
A somewhat similar set of control variables is included in the earnings management regression. These control variables can be classified into two categories: (1) third-party certification and monitoring, and (2) incentive and opportunities for earnings manipulation. The first category includes auditor and investment banker reputation and a dummy variable indicating the presence of venture capital backing. All other things equal, an auditor and/or investment banker with a lower reputation may be more acquiescent to the issuer's management of earnings. Hochberg (2004) provides evidence that venture capital backing is associated with a reduction in earnings management in the IPO year, suggesting that venture capitalists might play a positive role in governing and monitoring the firm due to their unique expertise and knowledge. I thus predict that the coefficients on the auditor reputation (Auditor), the investment banker reputation (UWrank) and the VC backing dummy (VCdum) are negative. The second category of variables include leverage ratio (LEV), total accruals per dollar of sales (ACCSALES), average capital expenditure in year 0 and year 1 scaled by total assets at the beginning of year 0 (CAPEXP 01 ), and lgAge. Leverage ratio (LEV) is included to control for the documented tendency of firms to manage earnings upward in order to loosen debt covenant constraints (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). The total accruals per dollar of sales in the issue-year (ACCSALES) is used as a proxy for the accounting flexibility the IPO issuer has in manipulating earnings. I expect that more accounting flexibility is associated with a higher degree of earnings management. lgAge and CAPEXP 01 are used as proxies for growth. Younger and high-growth firms derive a substantial part of their value from highly uncertain growth opportunities, making it harder for investors to appraise such firms and easier for managers of these firms to mislead investors.
30 I thus expect capital expenditure growth to be positively associated with earnings management and firm age to be negatively associated with earnings management.
To summarize, besides STDRET, the control variables that are common to both regressions are: UWrank, VCdum, CAPEXP 01 , LEV, lgAge, and a set of IPO-year dummies. Underpricing (UnderP) appears only in the ownership retention regression, and ACCSALES and auditor reputation (Auditor) appear only in the earnings management regression.
It is important to address the simultaneity issue between the two equations since in my model, ownership retention and earnings management are jointly determined in that the strategic mix of the two is chosen to minimize the total signaling cost. Failing to control for such simultaneity in the design of empirical tests leads to biased estimates in both the exogenous, as well as endogenous, variables (Intriligator et al. 1996) . Thus, I estimate these two equations by two-stage least squares (2SLS). In this case, UnderP is the exogenous variable directly related to ownership retention, and Auditor and ACCSALES are exogenous variables that are directly related to earnings management. Hence, the twoequation system is fully identified.
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 8 present the first-stage regression of ownership retention and earnings management on all exogenous variables. The adjusted R 2 s are 13.35 percent and 38.82 percent, respectively, both with prob(F) Ͻ .0001, indicating that the instruments are jointly significant.
The second-stage regression results are presented in columns 2 and 4. The coefficients on STDRET remain significantly negative in the ownership retention regression (two-tailed p-value Ͻ 0.02), and significantly positive in the earnings management regression (twotailed p-value). Table 9 presents the two-stage least squares regression results using the issue-year performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (ADJADC 0 ). As predicted, the coefficient on STDRET is significantly negative in the ownership retention regression (two-tailed p-value Ͻ 0.05), and is significantly positive in the earnings management regression (two-tailed pvalue Ͻ 0.01). Performance matching, however, reduces the R 2 of the second-stage earnings management regression from 38.82 percent to 20.01 percent. The reduction in explanatory power should probably be expected, given that performance matching reduces measurement error in discretionary accruals that correlates with the growth proxies used in the regression, resulting in much less variation in the dependent variable ADJADC 0 being explained. In the earnings management regression, the variables intended to capture the incentives and constraints of aggressive accounting, ACCSALES, LEV, CAPEXP 01 , and lgAge, all have the expected signs, but only ACCSALES and LEV are statistically significant. The third-party monitoring and certification variables, UWrank and VCdum have the expected signs but are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Inconsistent with the prediction, the coefficient on the auditor dummy (Auditor) is positive, but is statistically insignificant. In the ownership retention regression, all variables have expected signs except UWrank, which is significantly positive.
In summary, I interpret the above results as generally consistent with the hypothesis that riskier firms will resort more to earnings management and retain less ownership to achieve separation in the signaling equilibrium.
The Accounting Review, January 2007 *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (for a two-sided test), respectively. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient estimate.
To reduce the influence of outliers, all variables in the regressions are trimmed at ϩ / Ϫ1 percent. Influential observations meeting any of the following conditions are deleted: absolute value of DFFITS greater than 2, absolute value of STUDENT greater than 2, or COOKD greater than 2, per Belsley et al. (1980) . All variables are defined in Section VIII.
VIII. SUMMARY This paper examines, in a rational expectation framework, how ownership retention and earnings management interact and how they jointly affect the valuation of IPO firms. Analytically, it extends the univariate signaling framework of Leland and Pyle (1977) and derives an efficient signaling equilibrium in which both reported earnings and ownership retention are endogenously chosen to convey an IPO issuer's private information. It is shown that even though either ownership retention or reported earnings communicates the issuer's *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (for a two-sided test), respectively. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient estimate.
To reduce the influence of outliers, all variables in the regressions are trimmed at ϩ / Ϫ1 percent. Influential observations meeting any of the following conditions are deleted: absolute value of DFFITS greater than 2, absolute value of STUDENT greater than 2, or COOKD greater than 1, per Belsley et al. (1980) . All variables are defined in Section VIII.
type to the market unambiguously, the issuer will strategically employ both signals to achieve separation at minimal cost. Comparative statics analysis also shows that the tradeoff between earnings management and ownership retention depends critically on the uncertainty over future earnings. The theoretical analysis generates a rich set of empirical implications regarding earnings management, market efficiency, and IPO pricing. Through systematic econometric analysis, I confirm the major predictions of the model.
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This paper seeks to make the following contributions to the literature: First, it proposes a non-opportunistic motive for earnings management around corporate events, and challenges the traditional view that earnings management during the IPO period is synonymous with managerial opportunism. Second, by examining how ownership retention and accounting information are priced during the IPO process, it sheds some light on the valuation of IPO firms. Third, by re-examining the evidence presented in TWW and TWR using a different IPO sample and a better measure of accruals, this study provides new evidence regarding efficiency of the IPO market and suggests that care must be exercised in interpreting results in prior studies.
APPENDIX Proof of Proposition 1
Since the identities of each type of issuers are fully revealed in a separating equilibrium, L has nothing to gain by bearing risk because there is no worse type to separate from. Hence we must have ␣ L ϭ 0. To determine the strategy of H , we need to find the equity fraction that H issuer must retain in order to deter L issuer from mimicking him. In other words, we need to find the values of that satisfy the following incentive constraint:
In the unique separating equilibrium that is Pareto-dominating, the optimal ownership retention for H is the smallest ␣ that satisfies the above inequality, i.e.:
Proof of Proposition 2 1) obvious.
2) When ␣ Ն ␣*, truthful reporting constitutes an equilibrium.
To show this, I check whether given the market's beliefs, L has no incentive to pretend that he is H . The benefit for L to report e H is that for the (1 Ϫ ␣) share of the firm sold, he would be valued as H instead of L , and get an increase in cash receipts of (1 Ϫ ␣)( 
To show that there indeed exists such an equilibrium, I again check whether the lowtype has an incentive to mimic the high-type by reporting r H . The cost of mimicking the high-type's earnings report is ␣C(r 
Proof of Proposition 4
Combining (A-3) and (A-4), I obtain:
As Ͼ 0, the non-mimicry constraint is binding, so we must also have:
After rearranging, I obtain the following two equations:
Notice that (A-7) is derived from the necessary conditions for the minimization of total signaling costs-the marginal rate of substitution of each signal must be equalized, whereas (A-8) is the ''non-mimicry'' condition. 
Ѩ Ѩ
Differentiating the above F 1 and F 2 with respect to ␣, r, and 2 , I obtain: 
